RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been the focus of a signifi cant amount of research. Specifi cally, scholars have looked at whether certain types of top executives are more likely to invest in CSR, and if so, what their motivations are for doing so. For example, do CEOs who invest in CSR do so to further the interests of shareholders and the fi rm's performance, or to enhance their own reputations? Or, are CEOs investing to further the interests of other corporate stakeholders at the expense of shareholders? What's more, scholars have asked whether these motivations are always mutually exclusive, and whether corporate governance of their fi rms affect CEOs' decisions regarding CSR. While scholars from a variety of disciplines have long debated these questions, the empirical evidence has been inconclusive. In particular, questions remain about the drivers of CSR and, more specifi cally, the role that top management plays in shaping a fi rm's investment in CSR and its impact on fi rm performance.
Fortunately, a recent study by Richard Borghesi (University of South Florida), Joel Houston (University of Florida), and Andy Naranjo (University of Florida) sheds new light on the subject by examining how the personal attributes of executives drive CSR investments. Borghesi and his colleagues suggest three reasons why top managers invest in CSR-for altruistic reasons, to further a fi rm's financial interests, and/or to enhance their professional reputations. In particular, this study looks at the political orientation of the CEOs-with the assumption that CEOs donating more to Democrats are more likely to invest in CSR. Borghesi and his colleagues also conjecture that CEOs facing more media exposure will be more responsive to shareholders or stakeholders. Finally, they consider whether CEOs' gender and/or level of experience infl uence attitudes toward CSR-related investments.
In addition to these individual-level motivations, Borghesi and his colleagues also look at organizational-level motivations. Specifi cally, they address whether corporate governance constrains CEOs' actions with respect to CSR investments. They maintain that strong corporate governance implies that shareholders with more power (e.g., institutional investors) may try to dissuade CEOs from investing in CSR.
Finally, the study also considers several different fi rm-level characteristics that may affect a fi rm's CSR investments, such as fi rm size, age, profi tability, advertising expenditures, corporate diversifi cation, and the competitiveness of a fi rm's industry. For instance, more visible (high profi le) fi rms may be more likely to invest in CSR. Likewise, fi rms with more organizational slack (higher profi ts and more cash, lower debt ratios) may invest more in CSR. And fi rms that are more diversifi ed and more global and in less competitive industries may be more likely to expand their CSR programs as well.
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Study data came from a sample of 11,711 fi rm years from 1992 to 2006. Following prior work (e.g., David et al., 2007; Kacperczyk, 2009 ), Borghesi and his colleagues used Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Co. (KLD) data to measure corporate attentiveness to stakeholders. KLD data evaluates several different dimensions of CSR, by looking at corporations' interaction with its key stakeholders (Kacperczyk, 2009) . Borghesi and his colleagues used KLD data to create various composite measures for each corporation in each year. Measures of fi rm-specifi c and industry-specifi c independent variables were drawn from COMPUSTAT and many of the variables looking at managerial characteristics were drawn from the ExecuComp database. For political orientation, Borghesi and his colleagues relied on Federal Election Commission databases to assess CEOs' political orientation. Lastly, media exposure was assessed by counting the number of news articles that mentioned each CEO in the Factiva database.
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KEY FINDINGS
The results showed that managerial characteristics matter in terms of understanding corporate investments in CSR. Younger CEOs, female CEOs, and CEOs who receive more media exposure are more likely to invest in CSR. Another signifi cant fi nding is that CEOs who donate to both major parties are associated with higher levels of CSR, suggesting that a specifi c political orientation is not driving CSR investments. In terms of media exposure, CEOs who receive more media exposure are much more likely to invest in CSR-perhaps because CEOs with more media coverage feel more pressure to be responsive to stakeholders and to act on the broader interests of society.
With respect to corporate governance, fi rms with more institutional investors have relatively lower levels of CSR. This implies that CEOs facing more constraints from their investors are less likely to pursue CSR investments. Likewise, there was a negative relationship between the level of industryadjusted CSR and shareholder value. Borghesi and his colleagues argue that this combined evidence suggests that CSR investments are not aligned with shareholder interests. They infer that CEOs' rationale for investing in CSR is either due to moral motivations and/or enhancement of their personal reputation. Moreover, the study found that large fi rms with more free cash fl ow and advertising expenditures have higher levels of CSR.
The results also shed some light on how fi rmspecifi c characteristics, managerial characteristics, and corporate governance affect corporate investments in specifi c dimensions of CSR. Most interestingly, larger and more globally diversifi ed fi rms with higher levels of free cash fl ow are more likely to make investments in the community and diversity components of CSR. Interestingly, fi rms with less cash fl ow are less likely to invest in environmental, humanitarian, and product categories of CSR. In terms of corporate governance, fi rms with entrenched managers are more likely to invest in the environmental and humanitarian components of CSR, and less likely to support investments for employees. This result suggests that shareholders prefer investments in employees rather than some of the other categories of CSR. On the other hand, companies with a greater percentage of institutional investors are also less likely to invest in the employee category. Finally, in terms of political orientation, Republican CEOs were less likely to invest in the environmental category of CSR while CEOs who were identifi ed as Democrats were less likely to invest in the product category. CEOs giving to both parties were more likely to implement policies and programs concerning employees and humanitarian issues.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study makes an important contribution to our understanding of how CEOs shape CSR investments. It also raises some interesting questions about why CEOs are making these investments. One of the questions that persists is, who benefi ts from CSR investments-shareholders, stakeholders, or the CEO? One theory is that top managers protected from short-term pressures can invest in social policies and programs that are mutually benefi cial for society and the fi rm (Kacperczyk, 2009) .
The fi nding that CEOs who are more entrenched are more likely to invest in environmental and humanitarian policies is consistent with this mindset. It appears that one of the constraints that fi rms face in terms of being able to broaden their stakeholder focus are the institutional investors who are fi xated on short-term results. Consequently, the challenge for CEOs is to demonstrate the payoffs and value associated with their CSR investments to shareholders.
Another interesting question is whether CEOs' political ideologies shape CSR investments. Borghesi and his colleagues challenge extant research on this question (e.g., Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013; DiGiuli, Kostovertsky, & Leonard, 2011 ) that fi nds that liberal CEOs are much more likely to invest in CSR than their conservative counterparts. In contrast, Borghesi and his colleagues fi nd that CEOs donating to both parties are much more likely to invest in CSR. They argue that CSR investments may augment a fi rm's political connections, rather than the reverse situation where political connections drive CSR investments. This interesting fi nding informs recent debates about whether a fi rm's CSR and corporate political activity substitutes and/or complements each other (e.g., den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker, & Kooijmans-vanLankveld 2014) . Either way, these are defi nitely issues that warrant further attention. That said, Borghesi and his colleagues did fi nd that a CEO's political agenda shapes the specifi c types of CSR investments made by the fi rm.
Lastly, this study fi nds that managerial attributes such as gender, age, and life experience impact corporate decisions concerning CSR. Since younger CEOs and female CEOs are more likely to invest in CSR, it does raise questions about the future direction of CSR investments. As corporate leadership continues to diversify and older CEOs become replaced by younger ones, it may be that corporate interest in making CSR investments will increase in the future.
